Speciesism, identity politics and ecocriticism : a conversation with humanists and posthumanists by Cole, Lucinda et al.
Strathprints Institutional Repository
Cole, Lucinda and Landry, Donna and Boeher, Bruce and Nash, Richard and Fudge, Erica
and Markley, Robert and Wolfe, Cary (2011) Speciesism, identity politics and ecocriticism : a
conversation with humanists and posthumanists. Eighteenth Century, 52 (1 Spec). pp. 87-106.
ISSN 0193-5380
Strathprints is designed to allow users to access the research output of the University of Strathclyde.
Copyright c© and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors
and/or other copyright owners. You may not engage in further distribution of the material for any
profitmaking activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://
strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the content of this paper for research or study, educational, or
not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge.
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to Strathprints administrator:
mailto:strathprints@strath.ac.uk
http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/
‘Speciesism’: A Conversation With Humanists. And Posthumanists. 
 
This e-conversation is based upon a panel entitled “’Speciesism’: Identity Politics Meets 
Ecocriticism” which convened at the most recent meeting of the Group for Early Modern 
Cultural Studies. Most of the panelists admitted to some discomfort with the prompt, 
reprinted below, and much of the discussion turned on the relationship between literary 
criticism and ecopolitics. A member of the audience asked what cultural work, if any, 
would be appropriate for literary critics working with this natural and critical landscape. 
The below remarks are attempts on the part of some of the field’s most prominent 
cultural historians to grapple with this question.     L.C 
 
Lucinda Cole: In his recent book Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of 
Species, and Posthumanist Theory,  Cary Wolfe attempts to develop a posthumanist 
account of the subject. In this he follows Georges Bataille, Jacques Derrida, and Rene 
Girard, among others, all of whom have attended to how the “human” requires 
construction of an “animal” other. In this sense, Western thinking is intrinsically 
“speciesist.” As Wolfe writes: 
 
The effective power of the discourse of species when applied to social others of 
whatever sort relies, then, on a prior taking for granted of the institution of 
speciesism—that is, of the ethical acceptability of the systematic “noncriminal 
putting to death” of animals based solely on their species. And because the 
discourse of speciesism, once anchored in this material, institutional base, can be 
used to mark any social other, we need to understand that the ethical and 
philosophical urgency of confronting the institution of speciesism and crafting a 
posthumanist theory of the subject has nothing to do with whether you like 
animals. We all, human and nonhuman alike, have a stake in the discourse and 
institution of speciesism; it is by no means limited to its overwhelmingly direct 
and disproportionate effect on animals. Indeed, as Gayatri Spivak puts it, “The 
great doctrines of identity of the ethical universal, in terms of which liberalism 
thought out its ethical programmes, played history false, because the identity was 
disengaged in terms of who was and who was not human. That’s why all of these 
projects, the justification of slavery, as well as the justification of Christianization, 
seemed to be alright; because, after all, these people had not graduated into 
humanhood (7). 
 
As scholars of the early modern period whose work is tethered to “animal studies,” many 
of you have in one way or another written about the history of liberalism to which Wolfe, 
via Spivak, refers. You’ve demonstrated the effects of our “great doctrines of identity” as 
they have played out in one or another historical and cultural context. Based upon your 
scholarship and personal experience, to what extent do you share the urgency Wolfe 
expresses about “confronting the institution of speciesism” and “crafting a posthumanist 
theory of the subject”? 
 
Donna Landry: 
 
In Animal Liberation, published in 1975, Peter Singer first proposed that speciesism was 
comparable with sexism and racism. The proposed rubric for our discussion follows this 
same logic. However, does the second part of our rubric, ecocriticism, necessarily follow the 
same logic as identity politics, or as Singer’s utilitarian ethics? Does ecological thinking even 
admit the possibility of an animal rights’ position such as that advocated by Tom Regan, and 
implicitly endorsed by Cary Wolfe? Wolfe wishes us to develop a “posthumanist” theory of 
the subject, to go beyond liberal humanism in the direction of a greater emancipation of 
subjects than has ever been achieved under the banner of liberalism. That is how I 
understand his citation of Gayatri Spivak, as pertaining to the historical  failure of the 
enlightenment completely to unfold, requiring our “ab-use” of it in the present: “a seizure 
from below” (Spivak 219). If, as Bruno Latour has claimed, we have never been modern, we 
have never been fully human either. Humanity defined zoologically and anthropologically – 
humanity as a species – does not exclude slaves, women, the working classes, colonized 
peoples. This is something that Marx was at some pains to point out with his concept of 
species-being. What does homo sapiens require for its well being, even its flourishing, its 
“happiness” in itself and for itself as a species? (Marx 70-101; see also Benton 26-30; 45-57). 
  
One of the problems with Singer’s critique of speciesism as discrimination is that the very 
notion of discrimination is more complicated than it might at first appear, especially with 
regard to species not as a category of prejudice but as a category of knowledge, as in Marx’s 
concept of species-being or Darwin’s notion of evolution of species. Although the category 
of species may be no less a construct than is sex or gender or race, to have zoological 
explanatory power, it must bear some relation to the actual qualities and requirements of the 
species in question, beyond mere prejudice. Discrimination as Singer employs the term 
means discrimination on the grounds of group-belonging, and here discrimination is 
equivalent to prejudice. But discrimination also means the making of, or apprehending of, 
distinctions; being able to discriminate or distinguish on the basis of knowledge of the 
objects or subjects in question. Discrimination in this sense carries the connotation of 
knowledgeable distinctions, not merely prejudicial ones.  
 
If we turn now to ecological thinking, the importance of speciesism in this second sense 
becomes clear. Animal rights remains based on liberal notions of the individual subject. 
Regan’s subject-of-a-life criterion exemplifies this. From an ecological perspective, however, 
the operative category in debates about biodiversity, sustainability, endangered status, 
conservation, and preservation is the species, not the individual. Keith Tester makes this 
clear when he writes that for an animal rights protester against fox hunting, for instance, it is 
the suffering or welfare of the individual fox that is at stake (Tester 179-93). For the 
ecologist, it is the welfare of the species as a whole that is at stake, and also the welfare of the 
entire habitat, not only of vulpes vulpes in isolation, but of foxes in their relations with all other 
species: the entire ecosystem of the bioregion in which said foxes live. Preserving as much 
wilderness as possible, and tackling corporate interests that are indiscriminately plundering 
the globe, become important emphases for deep and social ecology. Once ecocriticism has 
become part of the equation, the analogy with New Social Movements in their liberal -
enlightened focus on individual subjects breaks down. Species-being, and flourishing, 
replaces individual lives, their suffering, and their right-to-life or death, as the critical 
criterion for determining ethical action. According to this logic, wildlife conservation and the 
maintenance of biodiversity might require an engagement with recreational hunting, for 
instance. 
 
This is a different terrain of debate from the philosophical one of “thinking with animals” 
which, in their different ways, Levi-Strauss, Derrida, Vicki Hearne, Donna Haraway, Paul 
Patton,  Erica Fudge, and Wolfe have pioneered. I want to shift the terrain once more to a 
slightly less Eurocentric, or Euroamerican one, by considering the dog’s eye view of human-
animal relations given us by the Nobel prize-winning Turkish novelist Orhan Pamuk, poised 
between Europe and Asia. Recent discussions of Habermas’s theory of the public sphere 
have begun to acknowledge the coffee house’s Arab and Ottoman roots. At the heart of 
Pamuk’s conjuring of the early modern coffee houses of Istanbul is a dog, both a dog who 
lives at the coffee house, where his master is a storyteller, and a representation of a dog, a 
drawing or sketch. The dog remarks that a puritanical cleric from Erzurum has been seeking 
to have the coffee houses closed down because they encourage social mixing and sedition; 
the cleric is afraid that men “become so besotted with coffee” that they “actually listen to 
and believe what dogs and mongrels have to say.”  The dog, after having enjoyed some 
coffee himself, poured out for him by his master, retorts:  
 With your permission, I’d like to respond to this last comment by the esteemed 
cleric. . .  I’m a great admirer of our coffeehouses . . .  In the lands of the infidel 
Franks, the so-called Europeans, every dog has an owner. These poor animals are 
paraded on the streets with chains around their necks, they’re fettered like the most  
miserable of slaves and dragged around in isolation. . .  Dogs who roam the streets of 
Istanbul freely in packs and communities, the way we do, dogs who threaten people 
if necessary, . . . such dogs are beyond the infidels’ conception. . .  It’s not that I 
haven’t thought that this might be why followers of the Erzurumi oppose praying for 
dogs and feeding them meat on the streets of Istanbul in exchange for divine favors 
and even why they oppose the establishment of charities that perform such services. 
If they intend both to treat us as enemies and make infidels of us, let me remind 
them that being an enemy to dogs and being an infidel are one and the same. 
(Pamuk, 12-14). 
I recommend thinking with Pamuk, and Pamuk’s dog, about identity politics. This dog, 
resident of the early modern Ottoman public sphere, perceives certain cultural differences 
between East and West that may appear quite strange, hence defamiliarizing, to a Western 
audience: the free and the unfree, the happy and the enslaved, may appear reversed. This is 
why consorting with mongrels in coffee houses amounts to sedition, never a bad idea in 
political and philosophical discussions if we seek to pursue elusive truths. This dog’s eye 
view reveals above all how imbricated East/West and infidel/non-infidel remain, despite 
their differences, for all subjects poised on the frontier between Europe and Asia.  
 
Which brings me to Carey Wolfe’s attempt to secure, by targeting the limits of postcolonial 
criticism, a certain radicalism for Animal Rites. Wolfe writes, “Bhabha’s work stands in 
relation to the gray gorillas as Crichton’s does to the Kigani. This is to suggest not that 
Bhabha is wrong, but that he is only half right” (189). “Half right” echoes punningly as “half 
write” – Bhabha has written only half the story. Might there also be, especially in relation to 
those gray gorillas, another echo of Bhabha’s famous formulation about the colonial other in 
mimicry being “not quite not-white”? Not that Bhabha is wrong, but that he is only half 
white. Perhaps the gray of those gorillas might mark an advance toward the whiteness of 
enlightenment? Mired in postcoloniality, Bhabha is still harping on brown. He hasn’t 
changed into his gorilla suit, or become a wolf in sheep’s clothing, or even in wolf’s clothing. 
If he were a proper theorist of postmodernity, that is, Bhabha, like Wolfe, would be able to 
see the animals for the people, which is essential for “making one’s name” as a Wolfe (189). 
Surely the point of animal studies in the humanities, or of books like Animal Rites, is not 
merely to displace, according to the imperatives of academic fashion, other critical -social 
movements, such as feminism, anti-racism, or postcolonial theory?  For here is where an 
opportunity to do some real work, of articulation not trashing, (re)presents itself: listening to 
dogs. 
 
  
 
Bruce Boehrer: My original input to this discussion was cast in the form of satire.  Out 
of respect for those who felt their oxen gored unfairly by that initial intervention, I will 
contribute this time in more sober fashion. 
 Like most of us in this conversation, I’m a literary historian by trade.  This 
occupation has chosen me at least as much as I have chosen it, since as far as I can tell 
there is nothing else in the wide world at which I am sufficiently competent to make a 
living.  Given that my life’s principal talent seems to involve reading books that interest 
no one else; identifying figures of speech, literary allusions, and parallels of plot; and 
writing books that interest no one else, I am perhaps understandably uneasy when my 
profession calls upon me to take a stand on questions of a political and ethical nature.  
Hence, in fact, my initial recourse to satire: not only do I see little reason to believe that 
my profession is capable of making a serious difference in such questions; I am also 
confident that any effort I might make to stand up for my own beliefs would in the end do 
more harm than good.  I have neither the charisma, the energy, the personal consistency, 
nor the record of commitment and activism that one would expect of an advocate for a 
cause.  In the event, satire seems the most appropriate political intervention for someone 
of my modest attainments. 
 And yet my own work has dragged me toward questions of animal rights and 
ecopolitics.  I didn’t plan things that way; I’m not that smart.  I just pursued questions 
that I found interesting: why does Shakespeare elide feminine and animal nature as 
forcefully as he does in A Midsummer Night’s Dream?  Why does Milton contemplate 
the nature of marriage and the character of bestiality in the same book of Paradise Lost?  
Why do parrots appear as often as they do in early sixteenth-century anti-papal satire?  I 
didn’t conceive of these questions as inherently connected to a program of social 
activism.  Frankly, I thought of them more as an exercise in old-fashioned philology, 
bolstered perhaps by some more recent theoretical notions.  And when my work began 
revealing its contemporary political implications and applications, I did not respond to 
these readily or well. 
 But I did begin to respond anyway, slowly and inadequately and with great 
gnashing of teeth, because the work left me no alternative.  During the writing of 
Shakespeare Among the Animals, I became a vegetarian.  Then I lapsed.  Then I went 
vegetarian again.  Then I lapsed again.  And now, more securely than before, I’m back in 
the vegetarian fold.  This has become a serious life choice for me, but precisely because 
I’ve done such a lousy job of implementing it, I feel I have no business presenting myself 
as an exemplar of the vegetarian commitment.  I’m just a poor slob trying to evolve, and I 
see no reason to believe that my evolution will be of consequence to anyone but myself. 
 It is for this reason, too, that I contain to wear my old leather jacket.  It dates from 
a difficult and unreconstructed time of my life, and while I hardly ever wear it at home 
anymore (one doesn’t wear such things much in Florida, in any case), I do make a point 
of wearing it at conferences.  It immediately punctures any pretensions I might make to 
animal-rights correctness, and for me it has become a necessary badge of shame.  Erica 
Fudge has pointed out that the eating of meat in seventeenth-century England could 
function as an important symbolic activity: a reminder of our fallen nature and need of 
redemption.  The leather jacket has become something similar for me. 
 So you may perhaps understand that when invited to consider–and still worse, to 
write a statement about–the politics of my scholarship, I find myself in exquisite 
discomfort.  I share Cary Wolfe’s concern with the poisonous character of speciesism, 
although I’m not entirely convinced that in confronting it we must also “craft . . . a 
posthumanist theory of the subject.”  As Peter Singer noted a long time ago, Hindu 
culture has long been more respectful of animal rights than has the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition; yet I see no reason to conclude therefore that the Hindu tradition is somehow 
posthumanist.  And in any case, I’m sufficiently aware of my own personal inadequacies 
not to want someone like me standing up for the things I believe in.  I’d rather just try to 
do them better. 
 
Richard Nash: I believe I am inserting myself third in the queue; certainly, in the brief 
comments I am going to offer, I am thinking through the comments that I have read from 
Donna Landry about listening to dogs and from Bruce Boehrer about sustaining 
arguments with oneself.  These seem to me precisely the kinds of thinking we need to 
shuttle between as we theorize more ecologically our notion of “world” in light of the 
challenges that “the problem of the animal” raises in theoretical discussions, particularly 
for those critical and theoretical formulations that have been launched in the service of 
“identity politics.”  The politics of occupying less choate identities, while listening more 
attentively to companion species offer, I believe, the best chance for sustaining and 
inhabiting responsibly our worlds. 
 Trained, like Bruce, as a literary historian, and inheriting some hybridized 
mongrel pedigree of literary/cultural/intellectual historian, I am drawn to anecdote and 
implication.  My microhistorical inclinations are never happier than when worrying a 
bone, whether material or intellectual; and lately my bones have tended to be canine an 
equine, filled with the marrow of race and politics, both global and local.  I want to resist 
the temptation of those inclinations here, if only because they are so thoroughly grounded 
in my consciously humanist inheritance that it might be good for me to reach beyond 
those anecdotes to a horizon I only glimpse slightly, catch faint odors of on the breeze, 
hear only in attenuated and intermittent snatches. 
 In thinking this way, I find it especially helpful to turn to a least likely source.  
That is, indeed, a longstanding practice of mine, and I have no idea where it comes from.  
In this instance, that turning is to the philosophical work of a feminist physicist, Karen 
Barad.  Her notion of agential realism (soon to be, if not already, articulated in Meeting 
the Universe Halfway) theorizes our encounters with the world, and particularly the 
experimental space of physics, through a reconception of subject-object dualisms that 
refocuses on the resulting “phenomena” as “intra-actions” between assemblages of 
subjects, objects, and measuring apparatuses.  There is much that is rich and powerful 
and productive in this theoretical refiguring of our world, and not least of those 
possibilities, it seems to me, is what such a re-orientation offers those of us who seek 
more useful descriptions and theories of our ecologies.  The empiricist encounter that 
Barad is re-theorizing posits both observer and observed as possessing autonomous 
identities, while her re-articulation of that position generates a world in which agents 
move in and out of collaborative affiliations. 
 Such a rethinking of the ontology of the world resonates in powerful ways with 
Donna Haraway’s provocative challenge to move evolutionary thinking beyond the 
paradigm of dominion to a serious articulation of what it means to think of “companion 
species.”  Our observations of the physical world have for some time now been 
demonstrating that ecology matters in fundamental ways to species evolution--that it 
simply does not work to imagine evolution of a species independent from its elaborate 
ecosystem.  To that extent, we have rather thoroughly accepted a governing logic of 
interdependence that runs counter to the long-accepted doctrine of dominion, under 
which one species of animal domesticates another in the form of divinely sanctioned 
subordination.  To think seriously of species co-evolving (canine and human, for 
instance) dramatically changes our constructions of ourselves and becomes an all the 
more important version of Donna Landry’s injunction that we do a better job of listening 
to dogs. 
 That is, of course, difficult for any number of reasons.  The language barrier is, of 
course, a difficult one; and all acts of translation involve difficult crossings, not equally 
innocent.  But some translations are harder than others, and Giorgio Agamben’s 
redeployment of Jakob von Uexkull’s useful term “umwelt” seems to me remarkably 
helpful here.  What is most challenging--and I find stimulating--about this notion of 
umwelt is the idea that creatures occupy different worlds, each inhabiting the umwelt 
rendered available by the perceiving sensorium.  As species, dogs and humans may be 
thought to coevolve, yet when they arrive in the form of two individuals--even if it is in 
that fictional coffeeshop--the space they occupy will necessarily be configured 
differently.  As we listen to dogs, we must know that we cannot hear as well.  Negotiating 
the translations across multiple umwelts that constitute an enormously more complex 
notion of “world” than that posited by Heidegger is a daunting challenge, but is also an 
exciting possibility, one that offers as a byproduct a dramatic, and potentially productive, 
rethinking of familiar categories of identity politics. 
 
Erica Fudge: Donna Landry offers a very helpful and succinct outline of core 
differences between liberal rights arguments about animals and ecological ones, and this 
is a distinction that might be used to distinguish ecocriticism from animal studies. It 
seems to me that the ecological argument, in which the species rather than the individual 
is emphasised, sits at the heart of much literary ecocriticism, in which landscape and 
nature in general are the focus and animals perceived only as part of that landscape. I am 
not denying that there is very sophisticated and interesting work going on in ecocriticism, 
just noting its particular interests. In animal studies, however, because the focus is on 
animals, the wider natural environment is the not the centre of attention, although, of 
course, it can be vitally important to some work. The animal - whether real or ideal - is 
the focus, and this focus can bring with it emphasis on particular concerns, about the 
nature of agency, for example. Such a concern sits at the heart of the construction of the 
self of liberal humanism, and is familiar to all who are working in the humanities. But, in 
retaining this focus on agency, animal studies scholars may not simply be supporting the 
liberal humanist construction of the individual, or the conception of animal rights that 
emerges from liberal humanism (although some may be). Much of the work in the field 
proposes that animals can have agency, a perspective that challenges the very liberal 
humanism that constructed these ideas in the first place (on animal agency see Fudge, 
2006a). As Richard Nash notes in his response here, it is possible to think about our 
‘encounters with the world’ as ‘intra-actions’ - as actions between individuals (human or 
otherwise) that construct those individual actors. In such a world animals can have 
agency. 
 
And this is where we can see most obviously the links between posthumanist ideas and 
animal studies. Clearly - and most obviously - the anthropocentrism of liberal humanism 
is challenged by animal studies (indeed, I wonder if the Humanities is still the 
Humanities after the entry of animals). By recognising the cultural and philosophical 
centrality of animals scholars are inevitably challenging the assumption of the centrality 
and significance of the human who exists in opposition to rather than in juxtaposition 
with animals. But we can go further. Neil Badmington offers a nice definition of 
posthumanism: it has, he argues, ‘interrogated the myth of humanism by activating the 
moments of pollution and the slow slide of certainties that have habitually been drowned 
beneath the white noise of uniqueness.’ (263) He recognises that animal studies can be 
part of posthumanist enquiry and, noting Cary Wolfe’s claim that cultural studies is 
‘founded upon the repression of “the question of nonhuman subjectivity”’ (262), 
Badmington proposes that we refocus our attention on the nonhuman and rename the 
Humanities the posthumanities (267-9). For scholars working in animal studies, such a 
shift is not simply fashionable - following a critical trend - it is a recognition that a full 
analysis of so-called human culture must include animals: as geographers Chris Philo and 
Chris Wilbert have argued, ‘With the human domestication of animals and plants, the 
number of non-humans existing alongside people proliferates exponentially, making it 
impossible to recognise a pure “human” society.’ (17) Virginia DeJohn Anderson’s work 
on the role of the colonialists’ cattle in the New World seems exemplary in this critical 
context. 
 
So where does Wolfe’s statement about speciesism sit here? Following Carol J. Adams, 
Jacques Derrida and others, Wolfe sees inevitable and unbreakable links between the 
speciesist relegation of animals to the realm of the inferior other and the human 
repression of other humans (I also found this in early modern constructions of the human 
[Fudge 2000; 2006b]). For Adams, ‘the oppression of women and the other animals [are] 
interdependent’ (16); for Derrida, western philosophy relies upon the concept of this 
creature called ‘the animal’ in order to establish and construct its own arguments which, 
in turn, prioritise a certain construction of the human (409). Thus Wolfe’s challenge to 
speciesism is not only or necessarily because he likes animals but because he sees the 
oppression of animals as inseparable from - foundational to - the oppression of humans. 
In these terms, if we challenge speciesist ideas we also challenge the construction of the 
human as a species splendid in its isolation from the natural world as a whole, and such a 
challenge can, surely, only impact positively on human relations with that natural world 
and the nonhuman animals that live in it. 
 
And this takes me to Bruce Boehrer’s statement that our profession is not ‘capable of 
making a serious difference’ to political and ethical debate. As early modern literary 
historians we are not tying ourselves to cranes to stop road construction, or endangering 
our lives at sea to highlight the destruction of the environment by the oil industry, or 
under threat of imprisonment for forcibly entering animal research labs. We are, 
however, involved in educating people - in the classroom and in published work - and 
this, as Louis Althusser knew, can be effective in challenging the status quo. I am not 
talking about convincing our students or our readers to become vegetarians. I am talking 
about doing what all good academics do best: asking our students and our readers to think 
about things that might otherwise go unthought: in the case of my own work, to think 
about what it means to be a human being; about how that being human has been 
constructed in history; about how that construction of the human that we live with now 
might impact upon the world we live in, the people we live alongside, and so on. It is all 
too easy to assume the human as a given and unproblematic category in the world, and in 
my work I want to probe the ways in which that assumption - that the human does not 
need to be thought, is not part of nature - has been constructed, what that construction 
allows us to do, and what scrutiny of the historically situated nature of that construction 
might do. I hope I do not preach; I hope that I open up for interrogation an important 
aspect of the way we live in the world. What my students or my readers do in their 
interrogation is their choice: my job is to prod towards thought. 
 
Early Modern Studies is, I think, particularly well placed to allow us to do this. The early 
modern period, as its name suggests, is a period when many key aspects of the modern 
world begin to emerge - in terms of our conceptions of science, selfhood, global politics. 
To read Bacon, or Montaigne, or Descartes is to read debates about the self in relation to 
nature that continue to be played out in contemporary philosophy. As well as this, as we 
literary historians know, the early modern period is also full of extraordinary literary 
works, works that are infusing those philosophical ideas with wonder. For example, when 
Satan declares, in a challenge to God’s power in Book I of Paradise Lost, 
  
The mind is its own place, and in itself 
Can make a heaven of hell, a hell of heaven. 
What matter where, if I still be the same ... (I, 254-6) 
 
not only is he kidding himself, he is also reflecting, surely, Cartesian ideas about selfhood 
in which the self - the cogito - is tied to neither time nor place, but only to itself. Such a 
rendition of Descartes’ idea (an idea that sits at the heart of liberal humanism) can hardly 
be read as a positive one, and perhaps we can read Adam and Eve’s exit from Eden ‘hand 
in hand’ (XII, 648) at the end of Milton’s epic as an alternative - more positive - way of 
being in a corrupt world, in which community and comradeship are preferred to 
individualism.  
 
Landry argues that literature can defamiliarise the world, and she is surely right: Milton’s 
representation of Cartesianism certainly fulfils this ideal. She proposes a contemporary 
Turkish dog story that leads us to think about very human differences - ‘East/West and 
infidel/non- infidel’ - as a model of the way forward for literary studies. I wonder if we 
can’t also find animals (more dogs, indeed) in early modern literature, that are leading us 
to think about animals as well as humans. For me, the oh-so brief story in The Two 
Gentlemen of Verona about the fate of the lapdog Proteus has sent to Silvia - it was, 
Lance says, ‘stolen from me by the hangman’s boys in the market-place’ - and Lance’s 
replacement of it with his own dog, Crab (4.4.53-55), says a great deal about the lives of 
animals that are present in early modern literature. These animals are utterly marginal 
(we never find out what happens to the stolen lapdog, although my imagination along 
with my knowledge of early modern ideas tells me it is unlikely to be a happy ending) but 
central to the plot; they are silent but speak volumes about their world; they are other and 
they are self (see Fudge, 2007). If we don’t read these animals we miss out on crucial 
aspects of the period, of its construction of itself and its construction of all of us animals 
(human and nonhuman) now.  
 
Robert Markley: 
 
The question of speciesism raised by the original panel at the Group 
for Early Modern Cultural Studies conference in February 2007 and 
addressed in this exchange by Donna Landry, Bruce Boehrer, Richard 
Nash, and Erica Fudge centers on a very specific understanding of 
"species": the tiny populations of mammalian eukaryotes that make up 
an infinitesimally small percentage of the organisms sharing the earth.  
In different ways, all of my colleagues' comments about the 
significance of animal studies in the early modern period suggest that 
the concept of species itself is tied to particular constructions of 
western moral philosophy, liberal political theory, traditions of literary 
and cultural criticism, and understandings of "modernity"—not to 
mention to the emergence of, and debates within, animal studies.  
Even if we situate the concept of species within a historical narrative of 
evolutionary biology—from Karl Linnaeus, to Charles Darwin and Alfred 
Russel Wallace, to Stephen Jay Gould—we still risk reproducing a kind 
of eukaryotic provincialism that reinscribes a host self-congratulatory 
assumptions and values about homo sapiens as the shepherd, 
manager, and conservator of the planet's biota.   
 
In their comments, Landry and Nash call attention to the ways in 
which notions of species and ecology are mutually constitutive.  
Although most participants in debates about animal rights, and 
scholars of animal studies more generally, identify themselves as 
environmental activists, the ecologies that they typically invoke—
whether in terms of habitat preservation, biodiversity, or landscape 
restoration—are those compatible with ideas of coevolution that exist 
within the restricted framework of, let's call it, mammalian hegemony.  
But there are more microbes in heaven and earth (and everywhere in 
between) than are dreamt of in humanist philosophy, and any efforts 
to wrestle with the problems posed by speciesism have to recognize 
that ecology needs to be rethought in non-anthropocentric terms.  In 
this regard, decentering humankind entails decentering our companion 
species as well—or, more usefully, expanding our understanding of 
"companion species" to include the innumerable species of bacteria 
and archaea without which we would neither exist nor have evolved.  
In this respect, I'd suggest, that by redefining the politics of species 
and speciation, we can develop ways to approach larger issues that 
(potentially) can get us out of the humanist/posthumanist cul de sac in 
animal studies: we can't live with the old humanism and we can't live 
without it.   
 
In the 1970's, Carl Woese revolutionized microbiology by comparing 
molecular sequences (rRNA) that contain the code for ribosome, the 
complex structure, found in all cells, that makes proteins. Rather than 
trying to extend a concept of functional evolutionism that focused on 
structural adaptation, Woese developed technologies to study molecular 
sequence analysis and thereby offered a means to assess the evolutionary 
relationships between organisms: in brief, the greater the number of 
different gene sequences between two organisms, the greater the 
evolutionary distance between them.  The outline of these relationships 
can be rendered schematically by what Woese calls the universal tree of 
life that divides biota into three phylogenetic domains: archaea, bacteria 
and eucarya (eucaryotes).  From a technical perspective, the ability to 
identify organisms by gene sequences (frequently analogized to digital 
barcodes) allowed scientists to perform comparative analyses by removing 
genes from their environments (without the long and tricky process of 
culturing them), subjecting them to sequence analysis, and then situating 
them heuristically in relation to rapidly expanding libraries of other genetic 
sequences.   
Because the study of rRNA and other genes from a variety of 
environments has increased exponentially scientific understanding of 
microbial diversity and distribution, the idea of species itself has undergone 
a revolution: distinguishing among species is no longer solely the product 
of structural taxonomies and comparisons but a heuristic—a set of 
complex inferences that can be drawn about evolutionary pathways, roads 
not taken, and abrupt and puzzling evolutionary ends.  If we shift the focus 
from microbes to those small offshoots of eukaryotes that we call "animals" 
and "humans," the problems of genetic and therefore evolutionary 
relationships grow more, not less, complex.  In common sense terms, the 
revolution in microbiology reveals that physiology—even seemingly self-
evident adaptations like the opposable thumb—is not history, and that all 
evolution is coevolution even "within" as well as between species.   
In a series of profoundly challenging studies, presented for non-specialists 
in books such as Microcosmos and What Is Life?, the evolutionary 
biologist Lynn Margulis has argued that species evolve by subsuming the 
genetic material—the gene sequences-- of other species.  Evolution is not 
a tale of self-fashioning adaptation or a cause and effect response to 
environmental stimuli, but a matter of existing life forms—the thousands of 
archaea that have taken up residence in the digestive systems of animals, 
for example—adapting as well as adapting to their environments in order 
to ensure the survival of their species.  Retreating from an atmosphere 
becoming increasingly toxic with their excreted oxygen a half a billion 
years ago, these anaerobic organisms sought symbiotic refuge in the 
hospitable environments of eukaryotic guts.  What we think of as 
Darwinian evolution—the "ascent" to "man"—is, for Margulis, a process of 
multi-species coevolution, ever sensitive to changing environmental 
conditions.  Bruce Clarke, among others, has located Margulis's work in 
the context of second-order cybernetics as an adaptation and extension of 
James Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis and its complex feedback loops 
between organism and environment.  For Margulis, the question "what is 
life?" provokes a host of questions about the triggers, pathways, and 
consequences of speciation.   
To talk seriously about coevolution is to relinquish, as much as possible, 
our eukaryotic provincialism as well as our anthropocentrism without 
surrendering to romantic idealizations of a "harmonious" nature that never 
was and never will be.  The question of speciesism, then, involves (at 
least) a double perspective on time and causation: evolutionary time (the 
object of scientific inquiry) and historical time (the subject of humanities).   
Evolutionary time is coeval with a geophysical time that can be glimpsed 
only through experiment rather than by experience.  There is, after all, no 
way to bring the "reality" of the Jurassic era into the domain of the 
humanities except by computer-generated, Spielbergian graphics.  The 
problems of this cross-disciplinary doubled perspective—which I've cast in 
terms that Margulis, Clarke, and Niklas Luhmann might find congenial—is 
also a way of seconding Bruno Latour's argument in We Have Never Been 
Modern: to privilege the historical time of the humanities is to remain 
entangled in the double-bind of philosophical and techno-scientific 
modernity, endlessly engaged in rituals of purification (the focus on 
speciation as classificatory mastery) and hybridization (defining 
coevolution by Dr. Dolittling the animals).  On the political implications of 
ecology touched on by Boehrer, Nash, Fudge, and Landry, I could hardly 
agree more.  But if the question of speciesism encourages us to see the 
world in non-anthropocentric terms, a full understanding of the 
situatedness of eukaryotic evolution should remind us that, upon this bank 
and shoal of time, we face an ongoing eco-climatological crisis that 
threatens to sediment us into the fossil record. 
 
 WORKS CITED:  
(Landry) 
 
Benton, Ted. Natural Relations: Ecology, Animal Rights and Social Justice . London and  
 New York: Verso, 1993. 
Bookchin, Murray, and Dave Foreman. Steve Chase, ed. Defending the Earth: A Dialogue 
Between Murray Bookchin and Dave Foreman. Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 1991. 
Fudge,  Erica. “A Left-Handed Blow: Writing the History of Animals.” In Nigel Rothfels,  
 ed. Representing Animals. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press,  
 2002. Pp. 3-18. 
Habermas, Jürgen. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere . 1962. Thomas  
 Burger and Frederick Lawrence, trans. Cambridge, MA: MIT and Cambridge:  
 Polity, 1989. Reprint 2005. 
Haraway, Donna. The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant  
 Otherness. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2003. 
Hearne, Vicki. Adam's Task: Calling Animals by Name. New York: Vintage/Random  
 House, 1987. 
Latour, Bruno. We Have Never Been Modern. Catherine Porter, trans. Cambridge, MA:  
 Harvard University Press, 1993. 
Marvin, Garry. “The problem of foxes: Legitimate and illegitimate killing in the English  
 Countryside.” In John Knight, ed. Natural Enemies: People-Wildlife Conflicts in  
 Anthropological Perspective. London and New York: Routledge, 2000. Pp. 189- 
 211. 
Marx, Karl. “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844.” In Robert C. Tucker, ed.  
 The Marx-Engels Reader. 2nd edn. New York and London: W.W. Norton, 1978.  
 Pp. 66-125. 
Oldfield, T.E.E., and R.J. Smith, S.J. Harrop, and N. Leader-Williams. “Field Sports and  
 Conservation in the United Kingdom.” Nature 423 (2003): 521-533. 
Pamuk,  Orhan. “Chapter 3: I Am a Dog.” My Name Is Red [Benim Adım Kırmızı].  Erdağ M.  
 Göknar, trans. New York: Alfred a. Knopf, 2001. Pp. 10-15. 
Patton, Paul. “Language, Power, and the Training of Horses.” In Cary Wolfe, ed.  
 Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal . Minneapolis and London: University  
 of Minnesota Press, 2003. Pp. 83-99. 
Regan, Tom. The Case for Animal Rights. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1983. 
Singer, Peter. Animal Liberation. 1975. New York: Ecco/HarperCollins, 2002. 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. “Foucault and Najibullah.” In Kathleen L. Komar and Ross  
 Shideler, eds. Lyrical Symbols and Narrative Transformations: Essays in Honor of Ralph  
 Freedman. Columbia, SC: Camden House, 1998. Pp. 218-235.  
Tester, Keith. Animals and Society: The Humanity of Animal Rights . London and New  
 York: Routledge, 1991  
Wolfe, Cary. Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species and Posthumanist Theory.  
 Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2003. 
 
(Fudge) 
Adams, Carol J. 1990. The Sexual Politics of Meat (Cambridge: Polity Press) 
Anderson, Virginia DeJohn. 2004. Creatures of Empire: How Domestic Animals 
Transformed Early America (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
Badmington, Neil. 2006. ‘Cultural Studies and the Posthumanities,’ in New Cultural 
Studies: Adventures in Theory, Gary Hall and Claire Birchall ed. (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press), pp.260-272. 
Derrida, Jacques. 2002. ‘The Animal that therefore I am (More to Follow),’ trans. David 
Willis, Critical Inquiry 28, pp.369-417, 
Fudge, Erica. 2000. Perceiving Animals: Humans and Beasts in Early Modern English 
Culture (Basingstoke/New York: Macmillan/St Martin’s Press) 
2006a. ‘The History of Animals,’ published on www.h-net.org/~animal/ 
ruminations.html 
2006b. Brutal Reasoning: Animals, Rationality and Humanity in Early Modern 
England (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press) 
2007 (forthcoming). ‘“The Dog is Himself”: Animals, Humans and Self-Control in 
The Two Gentlemen of Verona’, in How to do things with Shakespeare, Laurie 
Maguire ed. (Blackwell: Oxford). 
Milton, John. 1990. Paradise Lost, Alastair Fowler ed. (London: Longman) 
Philo, Chris and Chris Wilbert. 2000. ‘Animal Spaces, Beastly Places: An Introduction,’ 
in Animal Spaces, Beastly Places: New Geographies of Human-Animal Relations, 
Philo and Wilbert ed.  (London and New York: Routledge), pp.1-34. 
Shakespeare, William. 2004. The Two Gentlemen of Verona, ed. William C. Carroll 
(London: Arden) 
. 
